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Abstract—Logic locking has emerged as a promising solution
for protecting the semiconductor intellectual Property (IP) from
the untrusted entities in the design and fabrication process.
Logic locking hides the functionality of the IP by embedding
additional key-gates in the circuit. The correct output of the
chip is produced, once the correct key value is available at
the input of the key-gates. The confidentiality of the key is
imperative for the security of the locked IP as it stands as
the lone barrier against IP infringement. Therefore, the logic
locking is considered as a broken scheme once the key value is
exposed. The research community has shown the vulnerability
of the logic locking techniques against different classes of
attacks, such as Oracle-guided and physical attacks. Although
several countermeasures have already been proposed against
such attacks, none of them is simultaneously impeccable against
Oracle-guided, Oracle-less, and physical attacks. Under such
circumstances, a defense-in-depth approach can be considered
as a practical approach in addressing the vulnerabilities of logic
locking. Defense-in-depth is a multilayer defense approach where
several independent countermeasures are implemented in the
device to provide aggregated protection against different attack
vectors. Introducing such a multilayer defense model in logic
locking is the major contribution of this paper. With regard
to this, we first identify the core components of logic locking
schemes, which need to be protected. Afterwards, we categorize
the vulnerabilities of core components according to potential
threats for the locking key in logic locking schemes. Furthermore,
we propose several defense layers and countermeasures to protect
the device from those vulnerabilities. Finally, we turn our focus
to open research questions and conclude with suggestions for
future research directions.
Index Terms—Obfuscation, Tamper-proof memory, Scan chain,
Oracle-guided attack, Physical attack
I. INTRODUCTION
OVER the past two decades, the business model forthe semiconductor industry has shifted from vertical to
horizontal. In the horizontal model, the original component
manufacturers (OCM) outsource different steps of the chip
manufacturing process, like intellectual property (IP) design,
fabrication, and design-for-test (DFT) structure insertion,
to more sophisticated offshore fabrication facilities. This
approach makes the manufacturing process less expensive for
new technology development and scaling down the existing
IPs. However, due to the number of stakeholders involved
in design, integration, manufacturing, and distribution located
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around the globe, the OCM and IP owner/vendor have
lost control over the supply chain. As a result, IP piracy,
counterfeiting, reverse engineering, and hardware Trojan
insertion have become eminent threats in the semiconductor
industry. The conventional passive IP protection methods,
e.g., patents and copyrights, provide no protection against
the aforementioned threats. Researchers have proposed
several hardware obfuscation techniques, such as logic
locking/obfuscation [1], state space obfuscation [2],and IC
camouflaging [3] as an active approach for safeguarding the
IP.
Hardware obfuscation is a method of transforming
the design and layout of the IP while maintaining the
original functionality of it. Among the hardware obfuscation
techniques, logic locking is emerging as possible solutions
for establishing trust in the hardware design. Logic locking
hides the functionality of the chip by inserting additional
combinational logic gates [1] or increasing the state space [2]
in the design. Logic Locking is a key-based hardware
obfuscation approach and the inserted logic elements are
generally termed as key-gates. The output of the chip is
unlocked once the key-gates are connected to the unlocking
key-sequence which configured by the IP owner or OCM
through a nonvolatile (NVM) memory after the chip is
fabricated.
Although logic locking appeared as a promising protection
mechanism against IP piracy, the literature shows that this
approach is susceptible to several Oracle-guided attacks,
like Boolean Satisfiability (SAT) attacks [4], [5], Signal
Probability Skey (SPS) attacks [6] and key sensitization
attacks [7]. Over the past several years, the security community
has focused on developing countermeasures to hinder those
Oracle-guided attacks [8], [9]. Although protection against
the above-mentioned attacks received a lot of attention,
unfortunately, the security of the key itself is still ignored.
The reason for such ignorance is lying under the two common
assumption made in those aforementioned attacks. First,
as the untrusted foundry does not possess the key during
fabrication and has only access to the locked netlist/layout
and the scan chain, implemented as design-for-test (DFT),
only Oracle-guided attacks are considered as the most
acceptable method of key extraction. Second, the unlocking
key is written into a tamper- and read-proof memory, and
therefore, is protected against reverse engineering in the field.
However, an adversary such as an untrusted foundry with
access to most advanced failure analysis (FA) equipment,
such as microprobing station, scanning electron microscope
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2Fig. 1: Multiple protection layers in defense-in-depth
implementation for logic obfuscation.
(SEM) and laser scanning microscope (LSM), should be
more than capable of extracting the unlocking key from
a chip by contact-based electrical [10], [11] or contactless
optical probing [12]. Furthermore, the literature on logic
locking does not consider the threat imposed by an end
user with full-blown reverse engineering capability [13].
The task of a reverse engineer can be made difficult
through implementing physical layout obfuscation techniques
like camouflage cells, dummy vias, filler cells, etc. in the
chip [14], [3]. However, the aforementioned layout obfuscation
methods do not eliminate the threat of IP piracy by reverse
engineering. Fig. 1 shows all the possible attacks against logic
locking as well as required defense mechanisms to address
them. Thus, key-based obfuscation techniques are less secure
against physical attacks than previously thought due to the
possibility/ease of key extraction. As a result, after nearly a
decade of research, none of the logic locking techniques are
able to provide impeccable defense against IP piracy/theft and
root-of-trust violation.
The security measures developed for IP protection have
always been a one-to-one exercise, where a security designer
deploys specific technology to counter a specific risk or attack.
However, “hackers” are innovative and can bypass any security
measure implemented in the chip. Therefore, developing a
layered defense approach, known as defense-in-depth, can be a
more practical approach for addressing the security challenges
in the hardware security domain. The similar idea has also
been implemented in the cybersecurity community to detect
and prevent malicious intruders in a system. A multilayered
defense-in-depth approach, as shown in Fig. 1, developed for
a logic locked device, can defend the locking key value in
an obscured system against any attack by deploying several
independent protection layers and eventually raising the cost of
all attacks to unacceptable levels. Multiple defense layers also
reduce the probability of intrusion through any other backdoor
which was left open unintentionally.
Contribution: The main goal of this paper is to
introduce a multi-layer protection approach (defense-in-depth)
for various threats against logic locking. Developing a
multilayered defense for logic locking requires an analysis
of the vulnerabilities in an obfuscated chip. Understanding
of such security weaknesses contributes to developing a
comprehensive threat model; attackers intent, capability, and
opportunity analysis. Depending on the threat model, an
OCM can select the appropriate layers for implementing the
defense-in-depth for the device. Therefore, we first identify
the core components in logic locking schemes, and explain
the idea of defense-in-depth. The design steps for developing
a multi-layer defense to address the existing vulnerabilities of
the logic obfuscation is also explained. Then, we describe the
vulnerabilities of the core components in the locked chip. A
comprehensive analysis of susceptibilities at different stages of
the supply chain is presented as well. Such analysis facilitates
the developing of threat models for different adversaries.
Based on the vulnerability analysis and threat model, we
propose a six-layer security architecture for developing the
defense-in-depth concept. Consequently, an in-depth survey
of the existing security countermeasures, best practices, and
standards depending on the assets defending at each defense
layer is presented. Finally, a framework for developing a
multi-layered defense-in-depth for hardware obfuscation is
outlined for future work.
Defense-in-depth for hardware obfuscation can be
commonly compared with the “castle approach” as it mirrors
the layered defenses in a medieval castle to protect the “king”
from an attacker. In an obfuscated hardware, the unlocking
key is considered as the king in the chip. Hence, the
functionality of the chip is protected by holistic and multiple
layered defense scheme implemented as defense-in-depth
(Fig. 1).
The paper is organized as follows. In Sect. II, we discuss
the basics of hardware obfuscation and logic locking. In
Sect. III and IV the core components in a locked device
are identified and the idea of defense-in-depth is introduced,
respectively. We presented the the susceptibilities of the core
components in Sect. IV. Afterward, in Sect. VI, we explore the
existing vulnerabilities of the IC manufacturing process and
supply chain and explain threat models for different potential
adversaries. The architecture of the defense-in-depth model for
the obfuscated chip is presented in Sect. VII. The available
countermeasures to thwart the threat against the existing
attacks at different layers of defense and security standards are
reviewed in Sect. VIII. The future research opportunities for
developing the security of hardware obfuscation are discussed
in Sect. IX. Finally, we conclude the paper in Sect. X.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Hardware Obfuscation
The objective of the hardware obfuscation is twofold –
a) concealing the design secret, such as the algorithm and
implementation, against reverse engineering and b) making
the design unusable as a blackbox and unintelligible for
IP piracy. This obscurity can be achieved through changing
certain nodes, embedding additional logic gates, altering
state-transition-graph or manipulating device or interconnect
layers [14], [3], [1], [2]. Obfuscation methods can be classified
into three categories based on the design stage at which the
obfuscation is performed [15].
1) Pre-synthesis Obfuscation: Pre-synthesis obfuscation
is applied on register-transfer-level (RTL) IPs, which are
commonly known as soft IPs. A Soft IP is usually offered
3Fig. 2: Standard NAND gate (a) and NOR gate (b). These
gates could be easily differentiable by looking at the top metal
layers. Camouflaged NAND gate (c) and NOR gate (d). These
gates have identical top metal layers and are therefore, harder
to identify [3].
in a high-level language like C++, Verilog, or VHDL form. In
the case of pre-synthesis obfuscation, the IP is encrypted with
well-known encryption techniques, e.g., IEEE P1735 [16].
Obfuscating the RTL code with a finite state machine (FSM)
has also been proposed, where the code later traversed with a
key sequence or code-word [15].
2) Post-synthesis Obfuscation: post-synthesis obfuscation
is the method of hiding the true functionality of the device
under attack (DUA) through the insertion of additional logic
elements or modification in the FSM. The primary objective of
structural obfuscation is preventing IP piracy. Combinational
logic locking and FSM locking are two most researched
post-synthesis obfuscation methods in the literature.
3) Physical Layout Obfuscation: The objective of physical
layout obfuscation or layout obfuscation is to thwart the IP
reverse engineering and prevent any malicious modifications
in the layout. In this method, the physical characteristics of
the circuit or the layout is modified to increase ambiguity
in cell identification or connectivity. Several techniques have
been proposed for layout obfuscation, such as doping based
techniques, and dummy contact insertion in the fabrication
level [17]. The layout can also be hidden at the cell level
using camouflaging cells [3]. Camouflage cells alter the layout
of two standard cells with different functionalities to appear
identical. Camouflage cells can be developed using real and
dummy contacts. As shown in Fig. 2(a) and 2(b), 2-input
NAND and NOR gates can be differentiated through analyzing
the active region and metal layers. These two gates can be
made looked identical (Fig. 2(c) and 2(d)) by introducing
dummy vias. Inserting dummy gates, dummy filler metal
or manipulating doping implant have also been used to
generate camouflage cells [14], [18], [19]. The insertion of
dummy vias and identical logic gates introduce ambiguity
in image processing based reverse engineering. However,
camouflage cells introduce area, power, and delay overhead
in the design [20]. In the case of gate-level obfuscation,
camouflage cell insertion algorithms [3] have been proposed.
Camouflage connections [18] and vanishing vias [21] have also
been proposed to prevent reverse engineering.
B. Logic Locking
Logic locking or logic obfuscation is developed to hide
the functionality of an IP by inserting additional logic gates
into the netlist of IP. Such protection is provided through
Fig. 3: Simplified example of logic locking method.
Fig. 4: Core components in an IC implemented with hardware
obfuscation.
embedding additional logic gates into the combinational or
sequential parts of the design (Fig. 3). While the former
approach is called combinational logic locking, the latter
is called FSM locking. In the case of combinational logic
locking, the extra embedded logic gates are known as
key-gates, which are connected to primary inputs that are
collectively referred to as the key. On the other hand, in FSM
locking approaches, the functionality of the IP is obscured with
additional states in the state transition graph [2]. Applying a
correct sequence of the key, an authorized user can initiate
the functional state of the IP/chip. In both techniques, the
design provides the correct functionality only if the provided
key-input values are correct. Otherwise, the IP does not reveal
correct input-output behaviour. The key value is only available
to the OCM and the IP owner and not available during the
fabrication process. Therefore, once the chips are fabricated,
they are transferred to a trusted facility for programming
the key, known by the design house, into a secure and
tamper-proof key-storage element. In the case of combinational
logic locking, it has already been shown that random insertion
of key-gates may not add a significant security feature to the
design [22]. Therefore, several key-gate insertion algorithms,
like the insertion of XOR/XNOR gates [1], [22], lookup
tables [23], and multiplexers [22] have been proposed.
III. CORE COMPONENTS IN AN OBFUSCATED IC
In this section, we discuss the core components of a
locked device. Each component is defined by its functions and
involvement in the security of the device. An IC implemented
with either combinational or sequential logic locking have
five imperative components – (a) Key-storage element; (b)
Key-delivery unit; (c) Interconnects; (d) Design-for-test; (e)
Obfuscated hardware.
A. Key-storage Element
In logic locking, the key value is not available during
the fabrication process. After the fabrication, the ICs are
4transferred to a trusted facility for configuring the key into
a secure and tamper-proof key-storage element (see Fig. 4).
As the key is essential for the correct functionality of the
device, storing the key in volatile memory is not suitable
for such a purpose. In the case of a volatile key-storage,
keeping the chip in a continuous power-up state to maintain
the stored value is not a practical approach in terms of power
consumption. Therefore, non-volatile memories (NVMs) are
the conventional choice as key storage elements. Flash,
EEPROM, eFuse, antifuse, and BBRAM are examples of such
NVMs.
B. Interconnects
Interconnects are the metal wires in the chip which
connect different elements, like transistors, capacitors, etc. and
naturally more complex modules, such as memory, processors,
cache, etc. in the chip. Depending on the functionality and
complexity of the IC, the number of interconnect layers may
vary. All devices exchange confidential data between memory
and other operational units in the chip through interconnects.
For example, The obfuscation keys and other security-critical
assets, such as encryption keys, device configuration, and
manufacturer firmware are typically stored in a key-storage
memory cells. Therefore, these memory cells storing the assets
are the root of the security for the design, which needs
exclusive protections, such as memory encryption techniques.
However, to process the assets in the logic, they have to
be transmitted to the logic parts of the chip through chip
interconnects. Hence, protecting the interconnects against
potential vulnerabilities, such as probing and bus snooping,
is equally important in logic obfuscation schemes.
C. Key-delivery Unit
The key value is compulsory for the operation of the
corresponding key-based obfuscated IP. Hence, initialization
of any IP must include reading the locking key from the
key-storage element. Thereafter, the key must be fed to the
key-gates through registers connected to those key-gates [13].
These registers, which can be termed as key-registers, should
be privileged registers to prevent any inadvertent manipulation
of key values and should maintain the stored data during
the entire operating period of the IP/chip. Moreover, the
unlocking key can also be stored in an encrypted format in
the key-storage [1]. The encrypted key must be decrypted
before fed to the key-gates. This implies the involvement of a
decryption engine. Furthermore, reading the key from secured
storage may include key-management logic in the chip for
cryptomodules. All the key-read circuitry, key-registers, and
key-management logic establish the key delivery unit for a
locked device and should be protected against asset leakage.
D. Design-for-Test
Design-for-Test techniques are widely used in modern
system-on-chips (SoCs) to ensure testability of internal circuit
elements for monitoring the reliability of the hardware design.
This added feature makes it easier to perform structural tests in
the hardware design. The manufacturing process is not perfect,
making post-silicon validation of designed hardware a vital
one. The purpose of functional tests is to verify the correct
functionality of the hardware design. However, functional tests
are very expensive and the complexity of applying them is
too high to realize. To circumvent this obstacle, additional
DFT logic is added in the circuit to overcome the difficulty of
functional testing in a divide and conquer fashion. For all these
obvious reasons, we are considering DFT as a core component
in an obfuscated IC. Design-for-test can be inserted in the
design by replacing sequential memory elements with scan
cells and converting a sequential design into a combinational
one to facilitate the structural testing process. However, these
scan cells can be used to attack obfuscated hardware designs to
extract keys, e.g., key sensitization and Oracle-based attacks.
E. Obfuscated Hardware
The last core element for the security of the chip is the
obfuscated hardware. The functionality and layout of the chip
can be concealed from an adversary by implementing different
logic locking and physical obfuscation techniques. Depending
on the objective of the hardware obfuscation, the obfuscation
techniques can be applied in three ways:
1) Device-level Hardware Obfuscation: At the device
level, the layout of the device is disguised by introducing
stuck-at-fault or delay manipulation [24]. Changes in doping
concentration, manipulating inter-layer dielectric, inserting
dummy logic and interconnects are conventional techniques
to achieve a device-level obfuscated hardware.
2) Circuit-level Hardware Obfuscation: The circuit-level
hardware obfuscation focuses on hiding the gate functionality
by modifying cell libraries [24]. Camouflage cells, filler
cell, dummy vias, and dummy interconnects are examples of
circuit-level obfuscation.
3) System-level or Gate-level Hardware Technique: Logic
locking techniques, i.e., combinational logic locking and
FSM locking are considered as system-level or gate-level
obfuscation techniques. The algorithms used for structural
and physical obfuscation methods are also considered as
system-level techniques for obfuscating the chip design.
IV. DEFENSE-IN-DEPTH
A. Motivation and Definition of Defense-in-depth
The vulnerabilities of core components leave a wide attack
surface available for different adversary to extract the assets,
i.e., the locking key, layout, and design implementation, from
the IC. Naturally, a single defensive mechanism against a
specific vulnerability cannot protect the functionality and
design of the chip against all potential threats. Once an attacker
bypasses the only defensive mechanism implemented in the
chip, the security of the entire locking mechanism is broken.
For instance, developing mitigation against oracle-guided
attacks, namely SAT attacks, cannot defend against the
threat of physical attacks, like optical and electrical probing.
As a result, multiple layers of countermeasures should be
implemented to provide protection for the IP/chip against
a wide range of attack vectors. Such a multi-layer defense
5Fig. 5: Steps for developing a defense-in-depth model for logic locking.
approach is identified as defense-in-depth. In this paper, we
present the defense-in-depth model where different layers
of security system address different vulnerabilities of core
components.
B. Developing the Model for Defense-in-depth
Developing a model for in-depth defense mechanism
for logic obfuscation requires a complex set of analysis
on interconnections and dependencies between the different
aspects of the supply chain, threat model, system design, the
protection mechanism, and assets. Besides, providing effective
monitoring and protection is required for mitigating the attacks
on the IC. Developing a defense-in-depth model for hardware
obfuscation can be compiled in four stages as shown in Fig. 5;
a) Security Analysis of Core Components: The first
step for modeling the defense-in-depth is identifying the
vulnerabilities that are present in the core components of logic
locking. The assets and methodology of extracting key and
design implementation form an obscured chip, i.e., the attack
surface of the IC is identified at this stage.
b) Threat Model Analysis: In developing
countermeasures and standards for protecting IPs from
piracy, overbuilding, or hardware Trojan insertion, the
capability of the adversary has been critically underestimated.
An attacker can exploit any existing vulnerability in the
design which may remain undetected for a long period
of time. Therefore, assessing the roles of the stakeholders
in the supply chain facilitates in identifying the presence
of potential adversaries in the supply chain. The attack
surface can also be defined using the vulnerability analysis
of supply chain. Analyzing the capabilities, goals of an
adversary, and availability of assets is another dimension for
selecting the attack mythology and significantly influence the
defense-in-depth modeling.
c) Developing the Defense-in-Depth Architecture: At
this stage, the designer defines the defense layers that protect
the chip assets (for example, the defense-in-depth layers
depicted in Fig. 1) based on the vulnerabilities of core
components, the threat model, desired level of security and
design budget, e.g., the cost of area, power, and energy
for the security of the design secrets. A malicious entity
can gain unauthorized access to design assets through the
simple shortcomings in the design architecture perimeter,
or embedded capabilities in the design that are forgotten,
unnoticed, or simple disregarded. Therefore, a multi-layer
defense apporach must address the protection for the
aforementioned ’backdoors’ in the device.
d) Security Standards and Selection of Countermeasures:
The next step for developing defense-in-depth is to identify
the effective countermeasures and protection schemes for
protecting core components from the adversary. Design
budget, i.e., area, power, and energy, defined at the architecture
stage plays definitive role in the selection of countermeasures.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF CORE COMPONENTS
Although most research efforts have been confined to
protect the obfuscated IC by improving the security of
obfuscated hardware and DFT, a comprehensive study about
the possible vulnerabilities of other core elements in hardware
obfuscation is still absent in the literature. In this section,
we will discuss the vulnerabilities of the core elements in an
obfuscated IC.
A. Vulnerabilities of the Key-storage Element
Protecting the key-storage element is vital for logic locking
schemes since the exposure of unlocking key breaks the
security of the entire scheme. NVMs, like ROM, EEPROM,
and Flash, are the prominent candidates for key-storage. The
NVM can be realized as off-chip or on-chip memory. As
off-chip memory is vulnerable to data interception attack at
chip boundary, on-chip NVM is the only suitable choice
as secure key storage. Although aforementioned memory
technologies are widely deployed by the industry as secure
and tamper-proof memories, the main vulnerability of NVM
is the availability of the data stored in the memory during the
power-off state. In this state, the memory remains defenseless
against any tampering attack. Therefore, an adversary can
deploy advanced FA tools to reverse engineer the memory
and readout its contents.
One option for securing key-storage is One Time
Programmable (OTP) memory, such as ROM, electric fuse
(eFuse) and antifuse. OTP facilitates to configure the device
before shipping to the end user once the chip is fabricated.
eFuse is a continuous metal or polysilicon shape etched on the
silicon surface. An eFuse structure is shown in Fig. 6a. When
a voltage is applied to the eFuse, electromigration causes
the open circuit in the cell (the broken fuse in Fig. 6a) and
program the eFuse [25]. An attacker with access to FA tools
can deprocess the entire die and locate the location of eFuse.
Later, using the scanning electron microscopy (SEM), she
can differentiate between the programmed and unprogrammed
eFuse link by observing the metal or silicide link of the
eFuse. Similar information can be extracted using electrical
probing. On the other hand, due to scalability into 7 nm
node technology, relatively smaller antifuse cells appear as
promising solutions to key-storage element. Antifuse is a
standard CMOS transistor which acts as a high resistance in
its unprogrammed state. Once electrical stress is applied to
the gate oxide of the transistor (see Fig. 6b), the transistor
acts as a low resistance conductive path. Antifuse can also be
placed as via between two metal lines in the chip. In such a
6(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 6: (a) Difference between before and after program of a TSMC eFuse structure in Qualcomm Gobi MDM9235 Modem
20 nm HKMG [25]; (b) 1T-Fuse Bit Cell in DesignWare OTP NVM IP. The cell is programmed by applying a controlled,
irreversible breakdown voltage from the gate through the core (gate) oxide to the channel [26]; (c) Key process steps for 3D
Nand fabrication process [27].
case, detecting the location of antifuse is difficult with SEM
imaging. SEM provides information about the die surface, i.e.,
the XY plane of the die. However, the lateral information
of the metal layers in the die is required to distinguish the
antifuse fabricated as via. The lateral information of the
metal layers can only be observed by transmission electron
microscopy (TEM). As sample preparation and imaging for
TEM are more challenging than SEM, differentiating between
the programmed and unprogrammed bits is difficult but
not impossible for antifuse. However, once the location of
anti-fuse is extracted the stored bit can be probed. Moreover,
all the OTP requires higher breakdown voltage and a large
peripheral circuit which introduce area overhead and power
consumption.
Other conventional examples of NVMs are EEPROM and
Flash memories. Each EEPROM cell has two transistors -
a floating gate or storage transistor and a select transistor.
The storage transistor has a floating gate which traps the
electrons. A Flash cell only has the floating gate transistor
and use the same logic storage mechanism as EEPROM.
Since both memory technologies use stored charges in the
floating gate for storing the bit values, any attempt to image
the memory cell with SEM or TEM can disturb the charges
distribution and possibly erase the memory content. Therefore,
reverse engineering of such NVMs has always been considered
as a challenging task; even after the recent advancements
in FA tools. Nardi et al. [28] solved the challenge of
maintaining the value of stored charge by accessing the
memory from the back-side of IC. Once an attacker gets
access to the floating gate of EEPROM/Flash, she can use
scanning Kelvin probe microscopy (SKPM), scanning probe
microscopy (SPM), passive voltage contrast (PVC) or scanning
capacitance microscopy (SCM) for extracting the stored value
in the EEPROM/Flash [28], [29]. However, the security of
the 3D Flash chips (see 3D NAND flash cells in Fig. 6c)
have yet to be investigated. In the 3D flash technology, the
memory cells, previously organized horizontally, are now
stacked vertically and connected with pillar and channels.
Although such orientation requires further precaution during
polishing the back-side of the chip and PVC analysis, the
reverse engineering of 3D NAND memory is, in principle,
still possible.
Physical unclonable functions (PUFs), as other possible
candidates for secure key-storage, was developed to generate
keys from intrinsic properties of the device [30]. Although
PUF has been assumed to be tamper-evident against physical
attacks, they have demonstrated vulnerabilities against several
non- and semi-invasive attacks, like photonic emission analysis
and laser fault injection [30] Furthermore, the response of PUF
differs for each chip due to process variation which makes it
incompatible for ASIC design, where the same mask would
be used for fabricating all the chip in the same batch. On
the other hand, storing the key value in the battery-backed
RAM also does not add any significant security feature to the
key-storage as they can be read out through optical attacks,
such as thermal laser stimulation (TLS) [31].
Data remanence in key-storage like NVM and RAM is
another class of vulnerability for all key-storage elements.
Data remanence is the residual physical representation (e.g.,
the trapped charge or voltage) of the data that has been
erased from the memory during a tampering attack or regular
operation of the chip. A tamper-sensor enclosure can initiate
the erasure procedure for memory if the tampering event is
detected. The sensor connects the memory to the ground to
zeroized the stored data. However, due to data remanence
effect, an attacker can exploit the residual property of the
memory to extract the content of the memory. The data
remanence vulnerability occurs when data retention time
exceeds the time required by a malicious entity to read
out or dump the stored value in another memory location.
Consequently, the protection mechanism can be defeated [32].
B. Vulnerabilities of the Interconnects
Sensitive information transmitted on wires in ICs can be
physically extracted using contact-based electrical probing
attack [10]. In this type of attack, the chip’s wires are contacted
by a probe, and as a result, the signal carried by the wires can
be read out when the chip is functioning. Therefore, electrical
probing is considered as a contact-based method for extracting
the assets in the chip. Electrical probing attacks can be
classified into frontside probing, which is carried out through
the passivation layer and upper metal layers, and back-side
probing, which is mounted through the silicon substrate.
Due to the large size of probes in comparison to the
size of metals’ width and available space between wires, the
frontside electrical probing is a challenging task. To overcome
these limitations, attackers usually deploy focused ion beam
7Fig. 7: (a) FIB deposits Platinum in the milling cavity to
build a conducting path (green) from the target wire; (b) The
deposited conducting path serves as a electrical pad for the
probe contact [33].
(FIB), which is a powerful tool commonly used in the testing,
development, and editing of ICs with nanoscale precision, to
mill a narrow cavity, get access to the target wire on lower
metal layers, and build a conducting path without damaging
upper metal layers as shown in Fig. 7. Modern FIB systems,
such as ZEISS ORION NanoFab, can edit out obstructing
circuitry with a 5 nm precision. FIB aspect ratio is a key
feature of FIB’s capability, which is defined as the ratio
between the depth and diameter of the milling cavity. Thus,
the higher of the FIB aspect ratio, the thinner of the milling
cavity, the less probability to damage signal wires on the chip,
and the higher success rate to extract wire values.
Some high-security level chips, such as smart cards,
may have shield-like mechanisms to protect the chip
against frontside probing attacks. However, this type of
countermeasure may still be compromised by bypass and
reroute attacks [10] using advanced FIBs. In the case of bypass
attacks, the attacker can utilize the limited space between
shield wires to approach lower target wires without hurting
the adjacent shield wires using high aspect ratio FIB. For
reroute attacks, on the other hand, the attacker can build a
copy path between two equipotential points on shield wires
using FIB’s deposition capability, so the original path between
these two equipotential points can be cut at will. As a result,
even shielding cannot provide adequate security protection and
it can still be vulnerable to sophisticated attackers equipped
with advanced FIB systems. The electrical probing attack
can be mounted from the backside of the IC as well[11].
In this case, the silicon substrate on the backside of the
chip is penetrated to create access to the lower metal layers.
Therefore, while reaching sensitive wires on the lower metal
layers is challenging through frontside attacks, they can be
accessed through the backside where there are little to no
protection mechanisms.
C. Vulnerabilities of the Key-delivery Unit
Similar to contact-based methods, the contactless optical
probing [12] techniques can impose the threat of exposing
security-sensitive information to an adversary, e.g., the
key value in logic locking schemes. Optical probing is a
semi/non-invasive chip debugging method, which enables
the probing of the volatile and on-die-only values of
key-registers and key-gates at run-time. In modern ICs,
multiple interconnect layers at the frontside of the chip
obstruct the optical path from the transistor. On the contrary,
no such protection is available on the backside of the device.
Hence, attacking the logic locking and FSM using optical
probing is more convenient if conducted from the backside.
In optical probing the chip must be operation. Therefore,
the selection of sample preparation method for the DUA
depends on the packaging, i.e., non-flip or flip chip packaging
technique. In non-flip chips, the die backside can be accessed
by decapsulating the packaging. Such challenges can be
avoided if the DUA is in a flip-chip package. The silicon
substrate in a flip-chip package is usually covered with
a heat-sink which can be removed easily using a lab
knife and hotplate [13]. Once the chip is decapsulated, the
device receives a global polishing to increase the resolution
for back-side FIBing and electrical probing. In flip-chip,
such polishing is not necessary for optical probing, and
therefore, optical probing can be considered as a non-invasive
physical attack which makes such attack more attractive to an
adversary [13]. Besides, in the case of optical probing, the
spatial resolution can be increased if the adversary has access
to solid immersion lens (SIL).
To attack the key-delivery unit using optical probing, an
adversary requires access to a laser scanning microscope,
which is available in advanced FA labs. Since silicon is
transparent to near-infrared (NIR) light source, the activity
in the die can be measured using electro-optical frequency
(EOFM) and electro-optical probing (EOP) [12]. These two
methods are major optical techniques used for debugging
nanoscale transistors. In both EOP and EOFM, the incident
photons with NIR wavelength pass through the back-side
of silicon substrate which leads to partial absorption and
reflection at interfaces like back-side silicon and active region
or first metal layer interconnect. In the case of EOP, the
electrical signal at a node modulates the amplitude and phase
of reflected light. The modulated light is fed to an optical
detector and compared with the reference NIR wavelength
laser beam (see Fig. 8b). As the modulation of the reflected
beam signal is small, a sufficient signal-to-noise ratio is
acquired through running the signal in a certain trigger
frequency (Tactivity in Fig. 8a and Fig. 8b) and measuring the
signal. In EOFM, a laser scans the region of interest (ROI) on
the device under attack and feeds the detected signal from laser
reflected signal into a spectrum analyzer acting as a narrow
band frequency filter, for example in the Fig. 8 the frequency
of narrow bandpass filter of the spectrum analyzer is Tactivity.
The output from spectrum analyzer is mapped in a 2D image
using grayscale or false color representation [12]. Analyzing
the output from EOP or EOFM, the data stored in a node is
extracted. The EOFM activity of an 8-bit register measured
at two different frequency – clock frequency and Tactivity, and
stored value in the 8-bit register is shown in Fig. 8c. Hence, an
adversary can probe the data stored in the registers from the
backside of the chip die without using the invasive methods
like FIB.
A malicious entity can always use advanced reverse
engineering tools to extract the gate-level netlist of the chip.
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Fig. 8: (a) The input signal connected to the gate terminal of an n-MOSfet operating at Tactivity frequency; (b) Reference beam
got modulated due to the activity of the transistor. The modulated reflected beam is compared and filtered at the same frequency
at the gate is operating; (c) EOFM activity measurement of a 8-bit register. The black dots in red rectangles represent the
clock activity, white dots in blue rectangles represent flip-flop activity and white dots in green rectangles represent the output
buffer activity. The stored value in each register is mentioned at the bottom of the output buffer.
Access to gate-level netlist enables the intruder to dig deeper
in the chip design and localize the key-gates and key-delivery
unit or the interconnects carrying the locking key of the
chip. Therefore, by learning the operating frequency for the
key-delivery unit and using EOFM, an attacker can probe
different key-carrying elements like key-gates, key-registers or
key-management logic and learn the locking key [13]. Hence,
optical probing is a direr threat for logic obfuscation as this
method can extract the locking key in a contactless manner;
without using invasive methods, like FIBing or circuit edit,
and contact-based method, like electrical probing.
D. Vulnerabilities of the DFT
Jeopardized by the worldwide IC supply chain, scan
infrastructure can be used to assist non-invasive attacks,
thereby compromising security. The exposed scan chains may
leak critical information such as intellectual property (IP) or
secret keys to the attackers, which can be carried out by any
entity within the IC supply chain. Hence practical solutions
are needed to protect ICs against scan-based side-channel
attacks [34]. In the last decade, there have been a number
of scan-based attacks on various cryptosystems. In [35],
the risk of scan-based attack is presented as a general
threat to a stream cipher. To obtain critical information, the
attackers can ascertain the internal structure of the scan chain
by running encryption in normal mode and then switching
to test mode. [36] have successfully uncovered scan-based
attacks on the dedicated hardware implementation of the Data
Encryption Standard (DES), Elliptic Curve Crypto-systems
(ECC), Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), and RSA. Since
scan chains directly reveal the internal state of the logic
blocks, attackers can use them to perform IP piracy With
the knowledge of the design, attackers can also control the
chip without authorization by scanning illegal values into the
system status registers to disrupt the chip. In light of these
threats, ensuring scan security has become a great concern to
the industry, and various countermeasures have been proposed
which are summarized in Table I. A detail discussion of these
threats and existing countermeasures are discussed below.
• Differential Attack and Defense: The differential attack [37]
is based on applying challenge pairs, running the crypto
algorithm, and comparing the outputs to extract the key.
This attack has been facilitated using scan chain due to
added controllability and observability. Through switching
from functional mode to test mode, the attacker can identify
key flip-flops from the scan chain. Then, the key can be
recovered through the already constructed correlation among
input pairs, key flip-flops, and key [37]. The most direct
solution to refrain from differential attack is to defuse the
poly-silicon fuses connecting the scan-in or scan-enable
ports [38]; however, this prohibits in-field testing which is a
must in advanced ICs. Some test mode protection techniques
have been proposed[39], [40] which attempt to reset the data
registers when the chip is switched to test mode and wrap the
non-volatile memories. However, test mode only differential
attacks[41] successfully extracted the key.
• Advanced Industrial DFT Techniques: On-chip
compression, X-tolerance, and X-masking are considered
natural barriers to scan-based attacks [42]. However, the
compression bypassing mode is always kept for the sake of
debugging and diagnosis. Recently some attacks have been
made even in the presence of on-chip compression [41],
X-masking [43], and X-tolerance [44].
• Scan Interface Encryption: In addition to the on-chip
compression used in advanced DFT structures, scan chain
encryption has been developed as countermeasures. In [45],
the scan patterns/responses are decrypted/encrypted at each
scan input/output, respectively, which is conducted by highly
efficient and secure block cipher at each scan port. But these
countermeasures are defeated by resetting attack[46] and
flushing attack[47]. By resetting the scan cells or flushing
the scan chain with the known patterns, the fixed inverted
bits [46] and modified bits [47] in the obfuscated scan chain
can be identified so that the plaintext can be deciphered.
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[36] exclude flip-flops containing sensitive information from
the scan chain. However, only part of the scan chain cells
can be protected. Besides, defects in the excluded registers
cannot be detected, which decreases the test coverage and
potentially impacting yield.
• Obfuscated Scan: In [46], [47], [48], [49], [50], dummy
flip-flops or other obfuscation logic (i.e., inverters, XOR
gates, etc.) have been inserted into the scan chain to
randomize scan outputs. A scan chain access authorization
process usually controls obfuscation. The scan out responses
are determined by the test authentication status. However,
some obfuscation logic inserted into the scan chain are not
robust against reset or flushing attacks [46], [47]. More
importantly, the scan authorization key bits hidden in the
test patterns are usually easy to locate [48], [49], [50].
Furthermore, the authentication key bit flipping would make
scan out vectors differ, while a non-key bit would not. This
would significantly reduce the difficulty of identifying the
key bits and becomes vulnerable to bit-role identification
attack[51].
• Scan Chain Reordering: In [52], the order of scan cells
is dynamically reconfigured by an unpredictable scrambler,
which increases the routing overhead significantly. In [53],
each scan chain is divided into several segments, and then
the test controller determines the segments scanning out
sequence. In [35], [46], scan tree architecture is applied to
reorder the scan chains. However, these methods still could
not defend against a differential attack [41], and require
significant change to the DFT flow.
• Combinational Function Recovery Attack: Since the scan
chains unfold the sequential logic as combinational and
directly reveal the internal states of the circuit, extracting
design information from them has become easier. Thus, the
devices functionality can be reverse engineered [54].
• Oracle-guided Attacks: While logic locking can be an
effective technique to establish trust among different entities
of the IC supply chain, it has not seen application due to its
lack of attack resiliency. The logic locking is proved to be
vulnerable against Oracle-guided attacks. In Oracle-guided
attacks, the attacker has access to an unlocked or functional
chip. A functional chip carries the key value in the
key-storage element. Therefore, such an IC can generate
the correct output for any input pattern and the attacker
can make use of the correct input/output pairs to rule out
incorrect keys and extract the correct obfuscation key. For
example, most logic obfuscation techniques are vulnerable
to Boolean satisfiability (SAT)-based oracle-guided attack,
key-sensitizing attack [7] and EPIC attack [55]. The key
sensitizing attack utilizes automatic test pattern generation
(ATPG) tool to propagate the effect of a key gate to a
primary output. SAT attack [4] breaks most combinational
logic obfuscation techniques in a short matter of time by
finding distinguishing input patterns (DIPs). DIPs rule out
incorrect keys utilizing the output corruptibility of the miter
circuit constructed using locked design and activated design.
For sequential designs, it is assumed that an IC’s internal
states can be accessed and controlled via scan chains to
TABLE I: Scan-based Attack and Countermeasures
Attacks Exploits ExistingCountermeasures
Differential[37]/Test
mode only Attack[59] Internal States
Scan encryption[45],
DOS[51]
Resetting Attack[46]
Internal Secrets
LCSS[48], DOS[51],
Lock & Key[60],
Scan encryption[45]
Flushing Attack[47]
Bit-role Identification
Combinational Function
Recovery[54] Functionality DOS[51]
SAT Attack[4] Obfuscation Key
SARLock[9],
Anti-SAT[8],
SFLL[56]
read/write the value of the flip-flops. To resist SAT attack,
several SAT-resistant logic obfuscation techniques have
been proposed- SARLock[9], Anti-SAT[8] and SFLL [56].
SARLock and Anti-SAT resists SAT attack by increasing
the number of required distinguishing input patterns (DIPs),
thus exploiting a point function to corrupt the output of
the design for all the incorrect keys. While these two
SAT resistant techniques are strong enough to withstand
the power of oracle-guided attacks, they are vulnerable to
Bypass attack[57], SPS attack[6], and AppSAT [5] attack.
SFLL[56] technique strips some of the functionality of the
original design and hides it in the form of a secret key.
Once correct secret key is applied, original functionality
of the design is restored. SFLL was briefly considered the
state-of-the-art SAT resistant logic obfuscation technique.
Then a recent functional analysis attack (FALL) [58] was
proposed that uses structural and functional analyses on
the locked design to identify the locking key, without
even having access to an oracle. EPIC attack [55] uses
a hill-climbing search based algorithm that monitors test
response to guess the secret key. The attack tries to reach
zero hamming distance between the test response of the
activated IC and the encrypted circuit by flipping the
individual bits of the initial key guess if the flip reduces
the hamming distance.
From the above discussion it is apparent that none of
the existing countermeasures can provide full protection
against attacks that exploit scan infrastructure. For example,
most countermeasures targeting scan-based side-channel
attacks, do not consider protecting against IP Piracy,
over-production, tampering and counterfeiting. A dynamic
scan chain obfuscation technique[51] has been suggested
for protecting IPs against most of the scan-based attacks
discussed above by dynamically changing scan obfuscation
key and scrambling scan-in patterns and scan-out responses.
But this countermeasure does not consider the threat model
of oracle-guided attacks e.g., SAT attack [4]. Vulnerabilities
of these attacks are further discussed in Sect. V-E. Hence,
developing such countermeasure is necessary that can protect
its secret against not only scan-based side-channel attacks abut
also scan facilitated oracle-guided attacks.
E. Vulnerabilities of the Obfuscated Hardware
The source of the vulnerabilities for obfuscated hardware
lies in the techniques used for obscuring the functionality
and layout of the chip. Any shortcoming in the security of
obfuscation techniques weakens the security of obfuscating
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Fig. 9: Attack methods for the core element in a logic locked chip.
key as well as all the assets in the chip. Therefore, we analyze
the vulnerability of logic locking and physical obfuscation
techniques in detail.
1) Vulnerabilities of Logic Locking Techniques: In the past
decade, there has been a number of attacks proposed to
retrieve the key from the logic locked circuit. The attacks
available in the literature can be classified into two classes
– Oracle-guided attacks and Oracle-less attacks. Different
Oracle-guided attacks are described in detail in Sect. V-D.
Along the aforementioned Oracle-guided attacks, side-channel
information like differential power analysis and test data
can be used to learn the key value in a locked chip.
Over the past several years, the security community has
focused on assessing the vulnerabilities due to Oracle-guided
attacks. While protecting the structural obfuscation from
the above-mentioned attacks received so much attention,
unfortunately, no evaluation has been performed to find the
information that can be extracted from the netlist alone. The
change due to logic locking in the netlist is local, i.e., the
key-gates combine with the logic elements in the netlist to
transform a new structure. Such structure can also be identified
if the adversary has prior knowledge about the synthesis
tools. Therefore, in desysnthesis attack [61], authors have
proposed, re-synthesizing the locked netlist with a random
key and then using hill climbing search to find the key value
yields the maximum similarity between the locked netlist and
re-synthesized netlist. Using machine learning techniques, it is
also possible to revert the locked circuit into the pre-synthesis
version of the design and retrieve the original design and
functionality of the chip [62].
2) Physical Vulnerabilities to Reverse Engineering the
Obfuscated Hardware: Physical obfuscation mainly focuses
on preventing the reverse engineer from stripping the ICs
layer by layer and extracting gate-level for duplicating a
netlist without authorization of the IP holder. Shrinking the
device dimension was never an issue for reverse engineering.
Continuous improvement and automation in FA tools along
with the netlist extraction software, such as Pix2Net, Degate,
etc. always proved to be successful against smaller node
technologies like 14mm . The reverse engineering software use
image processing techniques to identify the functionality of the
gates. In order to thwart automated image processing based
reverse engineering, several subtle obfuscation techniques like
gate camouflaging, dummy contacts, dummy interconnects
, filler cells, variation in doping concentration have been
proposed [3], [17]. However, layout obfuscation methods can
be detected using advanced imaging tools like PVC, SEM
or dynamic optical beam induced current circuit analysis
(DOCA) [63]. Using PVC or varying the beam voltage of an
SEM, a reverse engineer can distinguish between the active
cell and filler cells due to variation in doping concentration
[24].
The aforementioned camouflaging techniques are not only
vulnerable to failure analysis tools, but they are also vulnerable
to several attack methods, as for example SAT attack, brute
force attack, and behavior analysis. An adversary can isolate
the camouflage gates and sensitize the output of the gate using
input pattern to resolve the functionality of the gate using
the brute force attack [3]. Again, the adversary can perform
behavior matching against a library of components with
known functionalists to expose the functionality. SAT-based
de-camouflaging and removal attacks can also debunk the gate
level camouflaging [64].
F. Security Breach Through Hardware Trojan Insertion
Device assets such as the locking key should be protected
by hardware. The hardware contains physical countermeasures
against several physical attacks, tampering, side-channel
analysis and probing in particular. The aforementioned
protection imposes a significant barrier to attackers thus
11
implicitly providing a basic level of protection against key
extraction. However, an untrusted foundry can intentionally
introduce side-channel leakage by inserting hardware Trojan
in the design, in a similar fashion described in [65] for the key
of cryptomodule. Identifying the location of the key-storage
elements and the key-delivery unit and implementing a Trojan
to facilitate the side-channel analysis can empirically serve the
purpose. Hence, the possibility of a security breach due to the
presence of hardware Trojan into the design cannot be ignored.
G. Summary of the Vulnerabilities of the Core Elements
Each of the core components described in Sec. III acts as
a link in the web of logic locking to defend the chip design
form IP piracy and violation of root-of-trust. On the basis of
the above discussion, the attack methods for breaking into the
core components of an obfuscated chip and tamper its security
can be categorized in five classes;
1) attacks that involve either structural or information
reverse engineering methods,
2) attacks that involve contactless probing methods like
optical probing. In such methods, no direct contact with
the transistors is required for extracting the secret data
like locking key,
3) attacks that involve contact-based probing methods like
electrical probing,
4) attacks that involve access to design-for-test structure
such as scan chain, and
5) attacks on logic obfuscation techniques, for example, SAT
and SAIL attack.
Fig. 9 summarize the vulnerabilities of the core components
based on the above-mentioned five attack categories.
VI. THREAT MODEL ANALYSIS: SECURITY THREATS IN
IC SUPPLY CHAIN
In this section, the security and trust issues in the supply
chain, the stake holders, and the threat analysis for potential
adversaries are discussed.
A. Vulnerability Analysis in Supply Chain of SoC
In the last decade, the SoC supply chain has shifted to a
horizontal business model. In the horizontal model, several
stakeholders are involved in the manufacturing steps and
supply chain of the SoC (Fig. 10). Usually, OCM starts the
design process by acquiring the IP which is developed in-house
or purchased from third-party IP vendors (3PIP Vendors).
Later, the SoC designer incorporates the in-house developed
and procured 3PIPs to generate the RTL specification of
the whole SoC. The SoC integrator synthesizes the RTL
description into a gate-level netlist using computer-aided
design (CAD) tool, for example, Design Compiler from
Synopsys. The gate-level netlist then goes through formal
equivalence checking to verify that the netlist is functionally
equivalent to the RTL representation. Moreover, the gate-level
netlist is also verified to check if the design meets timing,
power, and area requirements. Thereafter, the SoC integrator
integrates the DFT structure to enable the IC to be thoroughly
tested during fabrication, package assembly, and in the field
operation to ensure its correct functionality. Due to aggressive
time-to-market, design houses may outsource some portion
of the design, e.g., DFT insertion, physical layout design,
to third-party design service providers and receive final GDS
from them. In the past two decades, most design houses have
become fabless. Therefore, they fabricate their products in
third-party offshore foundries. In this process, the SoC designe
house can enjoy the state-of-the-art fabrication technologies,
however, at the cost of reduced trust in the manufacturing
process (product integrity will be in doubt). After fabrication,
the offshore foundry sends tested wafers to the assembly
line to cut the wafers into die, and package the good ones
to produce chips. After these processes are done, assembly
performs structural tests to find defects in the chip that could
be introduced during the assembly process. After performing
these tests, the chips without defects are shipped to the
distributors, or the system integrator. The distributors sell
these ICs in the market. With all these discussions we can
summarize that IC design flow encompasses entities that
design their own chips (fabless design houses), entities that
offer design services to other firms (third-party design service
providers or IP vendors), entities that offer fabrication facilities
(offshore foundries), and entities that design and manufactures
their chips in-house [66]. Different stakeholders in the
supply chain have different motivations for IP infringements,
therefore, introduce different vulnerabilities in the supply
chain, as shown in Fig. 10
B. Potential Adversaries
The objective, assets and capabilities available to an attacker
influence the vulnerabilities that she might be interested to
exploit. As shown in Fig. 10, the untrusted foundry, SoC
integrator, third-party design service provider, and end users
can be identified as the potential antagonist against logic
obfuscation.
1) Foundry: The combinational logic locking and FSM
locking consider an offshore foundry as the primary source
of threat in the supply chain [2], [4], [57]. Since the foundry
has access to the GDS II file which they use to develop the
costly mask for chip fabrication, an untrusted foundry is a
major suspect for IP infringement. In addition, the attacker
also can obtain an activated chip from the open market, a
malicious insider in a trusted entity in the supply chain,
or from a fielded system. The capability of each foundry
also includes access to the state-of-the-art FA tools and
reverse engineering capabilities. Access to DFT structure for
detecting and analyzing the failure in the die is another asset
available to the foundry. Access to aforementioned capabilities
enables the foundry to reverse engineer the chip and localize
the key-storage element, interconnect, key-delivery unit,
key-gates, and DFT distribution to bypass the security of the
obfuscated design. Consequently, the implementation of the
circuit is crystal-clear to the foundry.
The objective of a rogue foundry is overbuilding and selling
the chip in the open market. The adversary can also locate any
specific IP from the design and learn about the implementation
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Fig. 10: Stake holders and corresponding IP threats in the horizontal supply chain.
and functionality of that IP for hardware Trojan insertion or IP
piracy. Depending on the objective of attack and obfuscation
technique implemented in the design, a malevolent foundry
can select its attack methodology. As the foundry can learn
about the location of key-gates and key-delivery unit; applying
FA methods like optical and electrical probing for extracting
the key value of the key-gate is more convenient for the
attacker [13], [67]. However, foundry can perform black
box analysis of structural obfuscated chip and exploit the
Oracle-guided (for example, SAT, bypass, and SPS attacks)
and Oracle-less (for instance SAIL, and desynthesize attacks)
attacks. However, the success of Oracle-based and Oracle-less
attacks is not always guaranteed. Further, the foundry can
deploy hardware Trojan for extracting the locking key. Fig. 11a
summarized the assets and capabilities of a foundry and
corresponding attack methodologies of an untrusted foundry.
2) SoC Designer: An SoC designer has access to the
soft/hard IP core, knowledge about the functionality of each IP,
and unlocked functional obfuscated chip. Besides, the design
undergoes extensive functional analysis for bug detection.
Furthermore, a rogue designer may have access to DFT
structures like the scan chain. The integrator also has the
knowledge of synthesis tools. The capability of the SoC
integrator can also include state-of-the-art FA tools and netlist
reverse engineering software.
The primary intention of a malevolent SoC designer for
attacking an obfuscated IP is IP piracy/theft. A rogue design
house may report a less number of chips to the IP owner or
clone the IP for selling it to other OCM. Hence, 3PIP vendors
always have trust issues with the SoC integrator.
With the aforementioned assets, performing an hardware
Trojan insertion, Oracle-guided and Oracle-less attacks on the
chip is more convenient for an SoC designer. Aside from
black-box analysis, a rough SoC integrator with access to
reverse engineering and FA tools can also deploy physical
attacks like optical probing.
3) 3rd Party Design Service Provider: As described in
Sec. VI-A, in the current SoC design flow, the 3rd party
design service provider has complete access to the gate-level
netlist as well as the scan chain implemented in the device.
Besides, the 3rd party design service provider can also gain
access to an activated chip. Their capability may also include
netlist reverse engineering and access to FA lab. The goal
for attacking the hardware obfuscation for a 3rd party service
provider is hardware Trojan insertion, IP piracy, and IP
overuse. Due to access to similar assets like SoC designer,
exploiting Trojan, Oracle-guide and Oracle-less attacks is more
convenient for 3rd party service provider. Furthermore, they
(a)
(b)
(c)
Fig. 11: The threat model depending on asset and capability
available to different untrusted entity in the supply chain –
a) threat model for the untrusted foundry, b) threat model for
the untrusted 3rd party design service provider and the SoC
designer, c) threat model for the end user.
can apply tools used for FA to extract the key value for
logic obfuscation or FSM locking. The selection of attack
methodologies depending on assets and capability for SoC
designer and 3rd party design service provider is depicted in
Fig. 11b.
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4) End User: The threat of end user is the most overlooked
concern in hardware obfuscation. The reason behind such an
assumption is a common perception that full-blown reverse
engineering is an expensive and expertise oriented process. In
recent years, advancements in the reverse engineering process
should compel the research community to revisit the threat
of IP piracy by end users. An end user only has access to
the unlocked chip and documentation related to that design.
However, she can delayer each layer, image those layers
with SEM and extract the gate-level netlist using reverse
engineering software like Pix2Net or Chipwork. Even without
having access to FA tools and reverse engineering capabilities,
an end user without reverse engineering capability can still
exploit the design vulnerabilities for extracting key value of
FSM or logic locked circuitry using side-channel analysis and
probing methods.
The potential adversaries for hardware obfuscation, their
access to assets, their capabilities, and possible attack methods
are summarized in Fig. 11. The possible access to capabilities
and possible attack methods in Fig. 11 are ranked from the
easiest to hardest.
VII. ARCHITECTURE FOR DEFENSE-IN-DEPTH
The objective of logic obfuscation is to protect the
functionality and design implementation of the chip.
Therefore, the unlocking key in structural obfuscation is
considered as the center of attacker interest. A designer can
select number of defense layers for protecting the locking
key, depending on the security budget, design constraints,
i.e., area, power, timing constraints. Besides, the threats and
vulnerabilities of the core components and supply chain
also define the security layers implemented in the locked
chip. Furthermore, a security designer must consider the
fact that, once an adversary finds the defense mechanism
implemented in the device, the attacker has an unlimited
amount of attempts to find a hole in the security layer. Hence,
failure in one defense layer may impact and even sacrifice
the integrity of other defense layers. For example, success
in structural reverse engineering allows a hacker to identify
suitable point of interest (PoI) for probing and even expose
the defense mechanism implemented against the electrical or
optical probing attacks. In our model we have considered six
layers of security for securing the key in hardware obfuscation
as shown in Fig. 1.
a) Layer –1: Hardware Assurance: The security of
the logic locking is established on the assumption that the
hardware is secured. Any malicious modification detected in
the design violates the assumption for root of trust, as well as
impose dire threat towards the assets protected in the device.
Hardware Trojan can also weaken the security mechanism
implemented in the chip. Therefore, establishing trust and
assurance on the device should be the first step towards
developing the defese-in-depth for logic locking.
b) Layer – 2: Defense against Reverse Engineering:
Defense against reverse engineering, both structural and
information, is considered as the first line of defense for
the obfuscated chip. Attacking an obfuscated chip starts with
breaking into the layout obfuscation techniques, learning the
implementation of the design and detecting the point of interest
for extracting the assets form the device. Although the cost,
time, and expertise are always considered as a challenge for
reverse engineering; once the completed reverse engineering
attempt exposes valuable information to the adversary. An
attacker can use that information for completing other attack
methods like optical and electrical probing Hence,protection
against structural reverse engineering, increases the complexity
of probing, and Oracle-guided attacks. Again, from the
vulnerability analysis of key storage element shown in Fig. 9,
it is also evident, extracting the key value through the
information reverse engineering can be a straight forward task
for breaking into the logic locking.
.
c) Layer – 3: Defense against Contactless Probing:
Once, the adversary knows the location of the key-delivery unit
and key-gates from layout reverse engineering, they can raid
the key-delivery unit and interconnect layers using contactless
method like optical probing from the backside of the chip (see
Fig. 9). In [13], authors showed the location of key-delivery
unit can also be extracted through partial reverse engineering.
Due to non/semi-invasive nature of the optical probing, cost
and time required for key extraction is much lower than
contact-based electrical probing attack. The FA tools required
for such analysis (laser microscope) can be rented for a few
hundred dollars per hours. Nonetheless, a modern chip does
not have any protection mechanism for the backside of the
substrate. Therefore, protection against contactless probing has
been placed in the second layer in defense-in-depth model.
d) Layer – 4: Defense against Contact-based Probing:
Extracting key value from interconnects and key-delivery unit
using FIB and electrical probing analysis involves invasive
analysis. Similar to FA tools used for contactless probing;
the tools required for contact-based probing can be rented
almost at the same rate. However, due to the invasive nature of
the attack, the time, cost and expertise required for electrical
probing is considered higher than optical probing. Although
several defence mechanisms have already been proposed, with
access to right equipment an adversary can still bypass that
defense mechanism. Hence, third layer in defense-in-depth
should protect the chip assets from FIB/electrical probing (see
Fig. 1).
e) Layer – 5: Defense for Design-for-Test: Literature
showed that access to scan chain makes logic obfuscation
vulnerable to several scan-based, Oracle-guided and
Oracle-less attacks (See Fig. 9). However, the access is
constrained to certain stakeholders which have been discussed
in Sect. VI, hence, the protection of the scan chain is placed
as the fourth layer in defense-in-depth.
f) Layer – 6: Defense for Logic Obfuscation Techniques:
Lastly, logic obfuscation protects the functionality of the
design. Attacking logic locking techniques requires reverse
engineered gate-level netlist, i.e., success in breaking the
first line of defense in the obfuscated chip. Similar to scan
chain attacks, logic locking can also be exploited using
Oracle-guided or Oracle-less attack methods to learn the key
value (see Fig. 9). As the presence of sequential logic poses
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difficulty against Oracle-guided attack, the defense for logic
obfuscation is placed in the fifth layer of the defense-in-depth.
VIII. SECURITY MEASURES FOR DEFENSE-IN-DEPTH
In this section, we will discuss the security measures
and future directions for developing defense-in-depth
countermeasures for hardware obfuscation for major elements
in chip design, i.e, the key-storage interconnect, key-delivery
unit, DFT, and obfuscation techniques.
A. Hardware Assurance
Detecting malicious modification in the design is the main
objective of hardware assurance layer in multi-layer defense
approach. Several hardware Trojan detection techniques,
e.g., run-time monitoring, test based approach, side-channel
fingerprinting, have already been proposed to ensure the root
of trust for the device [68]. However, none have proved to
equally effective or limited due to golden chip requirement,
time and memory consumption, process variation, subject
matter expert involvement, etc.
Reverse engineering can be an effective means for verifying
the the trust and assurance of a chip fabricated in an untrusted
foundry. However, the application of revers engineering is
limited by the lack of automation and invasive nature of the
method. The time and resources required for Trojan detection
can be further reduced by applying computer vision and
machine learning approach. In [69] authors suggested that, A
fast SEM image collected from the backside thinned IC can be
compared with the golden layout available to the designer for
detecting potential malicious circuitry. In this case, Supervised
machine learning and image processing is used to compare
the DUA and golden layout. A security designer can also
insert golden gate circuits (GCC) in the unused space of the
design and use the GCC to improve the accuracy of machine
learning classifier for detecting the any suspicious modification
in the SoC [70]. The aforementioned techniques for hardware
assurance can prevent the asset leakage like locking key.
However, meeting the aggressive time-to-market requirement
can still be a challenge for the OCM.
B. Defense against Reverse Engineering
1) Security Countermeasures: The defense against the
reverse engineering evolves around two core components in
the obfuscated IC – key-storage and obfuscated hardware.
Here, the protection mechanisms of those core components
are reviewed.
a) Protecting Key-storage from Reverse Engineering:
Developing a secured key-storage device is still a topic for
extensive research. Over the past decades, researchers have
proposed several methods to protect the NVM memory from
reverse engineering. Memory encryption can be a solution
against key-storage reverse engineering. In fact, memory
encryption techniques may be the topic of most research
activity aimed for protecting the data stored in main memory.
Encryption algorithms allow strong diffusion characteristics
that ensure a single bit change in the plaintext results in several
bit changes in the cipertext. Therefore, an attacker can retain
the key persists in the NVM, but in an unintelligible form.
Although such encryption prevents reverse engineering, the
designer should also consider the twofold of vulnerabilities
introduced by the memory encryption. The decryption method
would increase the read latency for key-storage which will
adversely affect the performance of the chip. Again, the
decryption key is also available in the chip which introduces
the vulnerability with side-channel attack and introduces
vulnerability for the key-delivery unit.
Anti-fuse technology is a promising solution as secure
key-storage due to difficulty in localizing and reading the
stored values in anti-fuse. This is a mature technology used
in FPGAs and PLAs. Memory cell with different threshold
voltage is also proposed as a possible key-storage cell.
Using controlled process variations like dopant value, the
threshold voltage of manufactured transistors can be varied
from nominal values. Later the variation in threshold voltage
is used to define the output from a logic cell [71]. Nonetheless,
before using this method potential vulnerabilities against SEM,
PVC, and other charge probing techniques should be addressed
to block the reverse engineering of NVM.
Emerging NVM memory technologies can be considered
as possible alternatives of the existing key-storage like
Flash, EEPROM. Emerging memories – resistive random
access memory (RRAM), spin-transfer torque magnetic
random-access memory (STT-RAM), phase change memory
(PCM) do not use the charge as storage media. For example,
RRAM typically operates by electrical switching between
different resistance states by applying high voltage, observed
in several metal oxides [72]. Applying high voltage across the
metal plates switches resistance states of the device. The high
resistance state is considered as bit 1 and the low resistance
state is considered as bit 0. As there is no visual difference
between the bit ’1’ and ’0’, it is difficult to extract the
stored value from memory. Therefore, the aforementioned
memory technologies are protected against the conventional
charge probing techniques like SKPM, SCM, PVC. However,
the susceptibility of the aforementioned memories against the
side-channel analysis, or other types of probing (for example,
EBIC/EBAC), or microscopy (for example, spin-SEM) should
be evaluated.
b) Protecting Obfuscated Hardware from Structural
Reverse Engineering: Several countermeasures have been
proposed to protect IC camouflaging against SAT, brute-force,
and sensitization attacks. In [20], authors have proposed to
perturb the functionality of the given design minimally by
adding or removing one minterm. A camouflaged block,
CamoFix, built up using camouflaged inverter/buffer cells, is
used to restore the perturbed minterm in the functionality
of the design. However, these techniques are vulnerable
to removal attacks [6]. Researchers have also proposed to
use layout-inclusive interconnect locking scheme based on
cross-bars of metal-to-metal programmable -via devices. Logic
locking scheme using antifuse to connect two adjacent metal
layer proposed in [73], incorporated dummy vias and filler
cells to eliminate the requirement for secure key storage.
Another solution for camouflaging the gate is to use
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different threshold voltage defined (TVD) logic gates [74].
The TVD logic gates are implemented with different threshold
voltage transistors by varying the doping implant in the
transistor. The gates have an identical layout, however, the
threshold voltage defines the functionality of each gate. Covert
gate is another variant for camouflaging cells [19]. Variation in
doping concentration and dummy contacts are used to develop
covert gates that are indistinguishable from regular logic gates
in a design. Further, the gates shows higher resistance to SAT
attack unless the location of the covert gate is identified.
2) Future Directions: Confidentiality of unlocking key
value significantly affects the security of structural obfuscated
IP/chip. Therefore, a key-storage should have the following
three properties:
(a) The key-storage must be read-proof, i.e., malicious entity
cannot reverse engineer or extract the key value form the
storage.
(b) The key-storage must be tamper-evident, i.e, it can detect
tampering attempts and zerozied the content irrespective
power status of the chip.
(c) The key-storage introduces lower area or power overhead
to the chip to be an effective solution for chip.
Developing a framework for accessing the attack resiliency
to different memory technology can be a contribution for
the research community. In recent years, several emerging
memory technologies have been proposed as a possible
selection for secured key-storage. The performance of
those memory technologies against known attack methods
– invasive, non-invasive or semi-invasive methods is yet
to be evaluated. Again, protecting the backside of NVM
from unauthorized access can contribute to protecting the
hardware obfuscation. Developing active or tamper-evident
shield to protect the memory can also be a significant
advancement towards securing the key-storage. Developing a
light key encryption algorithm can thwart exposing the key.
Furthermore, several other questions needed to be answered
like how to overcome the bottleneck due to read latency for
key-storage, erasing the residual data, and masking the location
of OTP from advanced imaging tools.
The challenge of developing physical layout obfuscation
technique is area, power, and delay overhead incorporated
with the camouflage cells. Besides, developing threshold
dependent camouflage cells involves dopant variation which
can be identified from SEM imaging of the die at different
beam voltages. Programming the TVD logic gates at the
post-manufacturing stage has also been proposed as a possible
camouflage technique [75]. The scalability of the TVD logic
gates is always a concern for the semiconductor industry.
C. Defense against Contactless Probing
Security against optical analysis mostly concerns protecting
the backside of the chip. Backside protection of the chip has
received more attention recently from the security research
community. The possible countermeasure for the backside of
a chip can be divided into two levels – device and circuit level.
A security designer can add a backside polishing detector
to monitor the thickness of the bulk silicon existing
Fig. 12: Scattered reflection of incident laser beam in a
nanopyramid implemented device [76].
below the transistor. It has already been proposed as a
countermeasure against mechanical polishing [77]. Adding an
active opaque layer can be another countermeasure against
optical probing. Implementing an active monitoring scheme
is required to detect the removal of such opaque layer by
an adversary [78]. Since the optical beam stimulates the
silicon active regions thermally, conventional photosensors
fail to trigger during optical probing. On the other hand,
the thermal simulation introduces temperature and current
variations in the circuit, which can influence circuits, such as
ring-oscillators (ROs) [79]. In this case, the implementation of
ROs as a probing protection scheme can be used to generate
an antitamper reaction in the chip to protect the locking keys.
In [76], nanopyramid structures are implemented in selective
areas inside the chip to mitigate optical probing attacks
by scattering the reflected laser beam, and consequently,
scrambling the measurements of the register contents. Another
proposed countermeasure is implementing a sandwiched metal
shield between two polymers, opaque to NIR, at the back of
the chip. As the layer can be removed using acid etching or
polishing the chip, associating the stability of the bulk silicon
to that sandwiched layer is required to prevent the adversary
from taking off [80].
A circuit-level solution can be widely accepted for the
semiconductor industry. As the logic locking key is static
and embedded in the device memory, it can be probed by
the aforementioned attacks. As a solution, the IP owner can
use dummy active registers connected to functional gates to
disguise the key-registers and eventually hide the key-gates.
Although, the circuit level countermeasures might be known
to a malicious foundry, and they can be easily deactivated,
these countermeasures can be considered more secure against
end users.
D. Defense against Contact-based Probing Attacks
Active shield, which is also called digital shield, is the
most common countermeasure against front-side probing
attack [81], [82]. In active shield technology, a signal carrying
shield is placed on the top layer(s) of the chip to detect
whether one of the shield wires is cut or not as shown in
Fig. 13. A pattern generator is required for an active shield
to generate flipping patterns to be transmitted on the shield.
Then, a comparator at the end of the shield compares the
received pattern from upper shield wires and another shield
pattern copy from lower layers. If there is a mismatch detected
at the comparator, which means at least one of the shield
wires are cut during the attack, an alarm will be triggered,
e.g. erasing all sensitive data stored in memory. The generated
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pattern should not be predicted or controlled by the attacker
since if the shield patterns are compromised, then the attacker
can synchronize the pattern at the end of the shield using
fault injection techniques. Therefore, the shield wires before
the fault injection sites are free to cut, which results in that
the integrity checking function of the active shield is totally
disabled. Although the active shield is very popular, its large
design overhead and vulnerability to advanced FIB system
limit the wide application of it. First, a naive active shield
on the top layer is very vulnerable to reroute and bypass
attack with advanced FIB system as illustrated in the previous
subsection. Then, the active shield typically occupies one
entire routing layer which is prohibitively expensive to designs
with tight cost margin and technologies with few routing
layers. Further, the requirements for a non-predictable and
non-controllable pattern generator determines that it is not
a simple and small component, e.g. a cipher-based pattern
generator with finite state machine (FSM) as its input, which
introduces large area and power overhead to the design,
especially when the design itself is relatively small, such as
an AES or DES encryption core. In addition, the attacker can
also utilize FIB’s circuit editing capability to manipulate the
control circuit and payload of active shield to disable it.
Analog shield and sensors are alternative approaches to
active shield [83], [84]. Unlike active shield which detects
the attack by comparing digital patterns, analog shield and
sensors utilize analog features, e.g. capacitance or RC delay,
at specific chip locations to detect the attack. One example
is the Probe Attempt Detector (PAD) [83] as shown in
Fig. 14. It detects the attack by measuring the additional
capacitance introduced by the probe on selected sensitive
wires. Compared to active shield which is covering a large
chip area, the PAD approach is wire-oriented which is difficult
to be applied to a large group of sensitive wires. Therefore,
if only a few wires are identified as security-critical wires
and need to be protected, PAD is a good option with small
overhead. Another example is charge sensor [85] which detects
the attack by sensing charges during the FIB navigation
process before the exact milling. An extremely sensitive local
charge sensor is placed close to the chip surface, which
could capture the charge changes and store the state for later
Fig. 13: Working principle of active shield and bypass attack
on active shield [33].
Fig. 14: Probe Attempt Detector (PAD) [33].
read-out. However, the charge sensor accuracy is limited by the
environmental noise and other power, voltage, and temperature
(PVT) variations. Further, the charge sensor is not working in
real-time, which leaves opportunity for attackers to neutralize
the charge before the read-out of the stored state in charge
sensor. In addition, one common and main limitation for
all analog-based countermeasures, which typically requires a
threshold value to trigger an alert, is that they are less reliable
against process variation. It is very difficult to distinguish
between an attack and a reasonable process variation when
the attacker’s footprint is getting smaller and smaller with
advanced equipment.
Different from active shield and analog sensor which are
designed to detect the probing attack, t-private circuit [86]
is proposed to deter the attack by exhausting the number of
simultaneous probes in a probe station system which typically
has 4-8 concurrent probes, so that the attacker doesn’t have
enough concurrent probes to extract one bit of information.
Fig. 15 shows the diagram of t-private circuit which transforms
the one bit signal X to m+1 bit signals (r1, r2, ...rm+1), so
that at least m+1 probes are required within one clock cycle
to extract one bit signal X . When m+1 exceeds the number of
probes that the system provides, it would be very difficult for
attackers to extract sensitive information through the probing
attack. The main issue with t-private circuit is that the area
overhead involved for transforming all signals in a chip is
prohibitively expensive (O(t2)). The scheme also requires a
random bitstream generated at every clock cycle for the signal
transformation.
To sum up existing countermeasures, we can find that every
single solution is not efficient enough to resist probing attack
and has its limitations. So, we need a holistic and efficient
solution against probing attack urgently because attacker’s
capability is always improving with advanced techniques. We
believe that the following directions and suggestions are worth
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Fig. 15: Input encoder (left) and output decoder (right) for
masking in t-private circuit [10].
putting more effort to improve current countermeasures against
the probing attack that can extract sensitive information from
chip interconnects.
Security designers should keep in mind that a successful
probing attack consists of many steps, such as navigation,
milling, depositing, data extraction, etc. Do not only focus on
the milling step, like most shield-based countermeasures. If
we can efficiently detect or deter two or more necessary steps
in an attack, we could improve our protection performance
and confidence to a great extent.
With the rapid improvement of the attacker’s capability,
especially for those attackers equipped with advanced FIB,
FIB’s capabilities, features, and limitations should be well
modeled and considered in the countermeasure development.
For example, FIB’s aspect ratio, which is the ratio between
depth and diameter, should be considered in a shield-based
countermeasure. It is because of the fact that the width and
space of the shield wires and the depth difference between
shield layer and probing target layer could determine if the
shield is useless for a FIB system whose aspect ratio is larger
than a specific value.
Almost all existing countermeasures have scalability issue
with large overheads in chip area and layers and performance
degradation, which is not acceptable for most high-end chips,
e.g., CPU, that have a very limited budget for security.
Therefore, a highly efficient solution is needed to protect those
most sensitive nets in the design with minimal overhead.
In addition, there is no effective countermeasure against
back-side probing occurring from the substrate of the chip
which might be more threatening than front-side probing
because it is much easier to get access to the transistors and
sensitive nets on lower layers from the backside.
E. Defense for Design-for-Testability
A number of countermeasures have been proposed in
the literature so far to thwart scan-based oracle-less and
oracle-guided attacks. A brief discussion of existing techniques
is given below.
Dynamically Obfuscated Scan (DOS): The authors in
[87] proposed a design and test methodology against
scan-based attacks throughout the supply chain, which
includes a dynamically obfuscated scan for protecting IP/ICs.
By perturbing test patterns/responses, and protecting the
obfuscation key, the proposed architecture is proven to be
robust against existing noninvasive scan-based attacks and
can protect all scan data from attackers in the foundry,
assembly, and system development, without compromising the
testability. The key difference of this technique from other
countermeasures is, rather than using a static obfuscation key,
authors have proposed a dynamic obfuscation approach where
the obfuscation key changes periodically based on the given
permutation rate and initial seed of the LFSR [87], making the
overall design resistant to scan-based side-channel attacks.
Low-Cost Secure Scan (LCSS): In [88], authors have
presented the low-cost secure scan (LCSS) solution. LCSS
is implemented by inserting dummy flip-flops into the scan
chains; it inserts the key into the test patterns with respect
to the position of the dummy flip-flops in the chains. By
doing so, it verifies that all vectors scanned-in comes from
an authorized user, and the correct response can be safely
scanned-out after functional mode operation. If the correct key
is not integrated into the vector, an unpredictable response is
scanned-out, making analysis very difficult for an attacker. By
using an unpredictable response, attackers would not be able
to immediately realize that their intrusion has been detected,
as could be discerned if the CUT were to immediately reset
[88].
Lock and Key: Lock & Key solution was developed to
neutralize the potential for scan-based side-channel attacks
[60]. The Lock & Key technique provides a flexible security
strategy to modern designs, without significant changes to
scan structure used in practice. Using this technique, the
scan chains in a SoC are divided into smaller sub-chains.
With the inclusion of a test security controller, the values
of access to sub-chains are randomized when being accessed
by an unauthorized user. Random access reduces repeatability
and predictability, making reverse engineering more difficult.
Without proper authorization, an attacker would need to unveil
several layers of security before gaining proper access to the
scan chain in order to exploit it.
Obfuscated Scan: Secure scan architecture using test key
randomization (SSTKR) was developed to address security
and testability issues [49]. Specifically, SSTKR is a key-based
technique to prevent an attacker from illegally obtaining
critical information while using scan infrastructure. The
authentication keys are generated through linear feedback shift
register and inserted into test vectors. Furthermore, test keys
are embedded into test vectors in two different ways: with
dummy flip-flops and without dummy flip-flops. In the first
case, dummy flip-flops holding the key are inserted into the
scan chain to randomize scan outputs. It should be noted
that all dummy flip-flops should not be connected to the
combinational logic. In the second case, authentication keys
are inserted into the positions of dont-care bits, generated by
ATPG to reduce area overhead and test time.
Scan Encryption: A countermeasure against scan-based side
channel attacks could be done through the encryption of the
scan chain content [45]. These attacks use an efficient and
secure block cipher placed at each scan port to decrypt/encrypt
scan patterns/responses at each scan input/output, respectively.
Scan-chain Reordering: A secure scan tree architecture is
developed to protect cryptosystems against scan-based attacks
[46]. This architecture offers low area overhead compared with
the traditional scan tree architecture followed by a compactor,
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locking, and test access port (TAP) architecture. In contrast
to the normal scan tree architecture, this architecture is based
on the flipped scan tree (F-scan tree). To be exact, they adopt
special flip-flops (that is, flipped FFs) in which inverter gates
are added at the scan-in pin of scan flip-flop. The flipped scan
tree architecture is built through normal SDFFs and flipped
FFs. Since the attacker cannot identify the position of inverters,
he/she is neither able to control the inputs, nor observe the
outputs of the flip-flops.
F. Defense for Logic Obfuscation Techniques
Although logic obfuscation can be an effective mechanism
for establishing trust in the hardware design flow, it has not
seen a widespread application in the semiconductor industry
due to its lack of attack resiliency and formal notion of
security. For example, most logic obfuscation techniques are
vulnerable to SAT-based attacks [4].
To resist SAT attack, several SAT-resistant logic obfuscation
techniques [9], [8], [56] can be implemented in the IP design.
These SAT-resistant logic locking techniques that increase
SAT attack complexity by increasing the number of required
distinguishing input patterns (DIPs) [9], [8] or by striping
some of the functionality of the logic locked design [56]
and hiding it in the form of a secret key, possess their own
critical vulnerabilities. For example, researchers have proposed
Bypass attack [57], SPS attack [6], App-SAT attack [5], and
FALL attack [89] that can easily circumvent the effect of the
SAT-resistant locking schemes. Further, these SAT-resistant
schemes are known to possess low corruptibility, and thus do
not provide the desired functional obfuscation. Hence, there
remains a need for developing SAT-resistant logic obfuscation
infrastructure. Since SAT attack relies on access to scan chain,
effectively obfuscating/locking the scan chain to scramble
scan-in and scan-out should help resist such attacks. A recently
proposed scan architecture [87] resists bypass, reset, flushing
and other scan-based attacks by dynamically obfuscating scan
chain where scan chain obfuscation key changes periodically.
This idea of dynamically changing obfuscation key can also
be utilized to resist SAT attack. SAT attack requires access to
unlocked IC (oracle), locked netlist and a number of iterations
to rule out incorrect keys. If the obfuscation key can be
changed each time before SAT attack succeeds, then attack
complexity would be drastically increased.
Developing key-gate insertion algorithm to improve the
output corruptibility for wrong keys as well as thwart attacks
similar to key-sensitization [7] can improve the defense
mechanism of the logic locking. A fault analysis (FA) based
key-gate insertion algorithm has already been proposed [22].
Increasing the dependency among the keys in the key-gate
placement is also explored in strong logic locking (SLL)
algorithm [90]. However, all these algorithms are vulnerable to
key-sensitization, or logic cone based [91] attacks. Moreover,
key-gate insertion algorithm can only be successful to protect
the key value, if the chip is protected from reverse engineering
and probing (both contactless and contact-based methods)
attacks.
IX. RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES
There is no single silver bullet solution for addressing all the
vulnerabilities in logic locking. Thus, multi-layer protection
for the logic obfuscation is necessary to prevent an attacker
from stealing the design secret. Although in this paper a
possible framework for planning and selection of the defense
layers has been laid, several other questions are yet to answer.
Critical challenges in developing a multi-layer defense
mechanism is to select the appropriate countermeasure that can
address the corresponding threat in a comprehensive manner.
The security designer has to decide the countermeasures to
implement for each defense layer. Identifying the security
metric and security rule check for defense layers can address
the issue of countermeasure selection. For example, the
designer can enumerate all known alternative safeguarding
techniques for contact-based electrical probing technique
and estimate the cost and time required for breaking into
the defense layer using the metric developed. Furthermore,
involving the attacker capability is also necessary for
developing a framework for the assessment of security
metrics. Therefore, developing a framework to analyze the
vulnerabilities and assessing security of the design at all
design stages can be a huge contribution in selecting the
countermeasures for each defense layer.
Another factor for defense-in-depth implementation is
the allocation of security budget in terms of area, speed,
power, and design cost for any specific embedded device.
Such analysis enables the integration of the functional and
countermeasure design in a holistic fashion. Moreover, the
reliability of countermeasure is also dependent on the speed,
power, and temperature variation such as sensor-based optical
probing detector may not be able to detect low power laser
beam if the security constraints are not selected properly. The
sensor may ignore the local increase in temperature while
optical probing is carried out at low laser power. For most
of the time, the attack level and available security budget for
a specific product are correlated. A high-end product with
high IP value may be confronted with attackers with the most
advanced equipment, and thus, may have more budget to adopt
more countermeasures in the design. Therefore, when the IP
value and the attack threat of a product can be accurately
estimated, the security designers can have more clues to
determine which protection technique can be incorporated in
the design.
X. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented a comprehensive study
of different vulnerabilities of the core components, i.e.,
key-storage element, key-delivery unit, interconnect, DFT and
structural obfuscation; in hardware obfuscation. Hardware
obfuscation is emerging as a promising tool for protecting
the IP/chip design and root-of-trust. Therefore, the dire threat
imposed by the vulnerabilities of hardware obfuscation core
components in an SoC can not thwart by one-to-one protection
scheme. Advancement in FA tools and algorithm based attacks
do not leave scope to consider any specific protection scheme
as the ultimate preserver of the confidentiality and integrity
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of chip design. Through using multiple safeguard techniques
to protect core components can defend the obscured chip
from a variety of attacks. Therefore, this paper introduced the
idea of a multi-layered defense mechanism which can ensure
defense-in-depth for the chip security. We have presented the
contribution of each stakeholder in the supply chain of the
semiconductor device. The outline for comprehensive threat
model is also presented considering the possible capabilities
and assets availability for all possible untrusted entity in the
supply chain. On the basis of the above analysis we proposed
a multilayer defense structure to establish the defense-in-depth
in the IC. We also discussed about the state-of-the-art
defense mechanism for each layer and challenges for paving
the path of the secured chip for developing a multi-layer
protection scheme. Addressing the challenge of incorporating
the multi-layer defense mechanism can be a significant
advancement in the field of logic obfuscation.
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